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Abstract—Data communication inside the satellite is one of the 
most important factors in satellite design. For this purpose, a 
variety of protocols have been developed in recent years. 
Controller Area Network (CAN) is one of the well-developed 
protocols to be used in the On-Board Data Handling (OBDH) 
systems for communication and geosynchronous satellites. 
Nonetheless, for aerospace applications which demand radiation 
hardened integrated circuits, a full featured stand-alone Rad-
Hard CAN controller is unavailable. HDL (Hardware 
Description Language) based IP (Intellectual Property) Cores 
which are widely developed to be implemented on Rad-Hard 
FPGAs are more attractive. This paper proposes a novel fault 
tolerant CAN controller based on FPGAs to provide on-board 
data handling requirements of the communication satellites. We 
outline some practical topologies and discuss their complexities 
and reliability. Despite the fact that the most famous methods 
like TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy), are very common 
among designers, the reliability analyses show that these methods 
are unable to tolerate single upsets in routing matrixes. This 
paper proposes a robust data bus controller based on dual duplex 
redundancy on FPGAs. The fault injection experiments reveal 
that the proposed approach represents better performance 
respective to the conventional hardware redundancy. 
Furthermore, the experiments show that the capability of 
tolerating SEU effects by the proposed method is increased up to 
7.17 times with respect to a regular design. The proposed 
architecture imposes 16.26% and 5.2% overhead in the required 
resources and the operating frequency in comparison to the 
regular TMR method. 
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Many of the wireless services offered today are based on 
the research efforts initiated by satellite communications 
scientists decades ago [1]. Satellite technologies have always 
played a key role in providing widely covered 
communications for ordinary as well as emergency situations. 
In order to have a successful satellite communication, we have 
to provide appropriate systems and facilities in ground 
stations, wireless data link, and satellites on orbit as shown in 
Figure 1. Modern communications satellites use a variety of 
orbits such as geostationary orbits. Most commercial 
communications and broadcast satellites operate in 
geostationary orbits.  The space radiation environment in GEO 
(geosynchronous) orbits is very dynamic, and satellite design 
for this orbit requires more challenges. Many works have been 
developed in the literature to partially solve this issue. A 
review of previous works found several reliable designs, such 
as fault tolerant filters, multipliers, coders and decoders, which 
are developed for satellites. In this paper, we aim to propose a 
fault tolerant data handling protocol that can be used for GEO 
satellites. 
 
   
Figure 1: Satellite communication 
Data handling and data processing inside the satellite can be 
implemented centralized or distributed. For a space system in 
which data handling is based on centralized methods, a central 
control unit is responsible for performing all the data handling 
and management tasks. This approach will result in a great 
amount of wiring, high complexity and weak reliability. In 
new spacecraft, the architecture is moving from fully 
centralized towards distributed processing and data handling 
via communication protocols [2]. There is a wide range of 
communication protocols that can be used in communication 
satellites, ranging from the extremely common interfaces such 
as RS-485 and I2C to the custom protocols implemented by 
individual vendors and application developers [3]. Currently, 
serial communication standards used for space applications are 
mainly based on MIL-STD-1553B and RS-485 which their 
inherent characteristics such as Master/Slave or Client/Server 
configuration make them inefficient to handle requirements of 
new systems (e.g. redundancy support) [3-5]. In the case of 
MIL-STD-1553, another withdraw is the high power 
consumption of interfaces that makes it a non-affordable 
solution for power restricted applications [5-6]. 
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The CAN protocol is an international standard defined in 
the ISO 11898-1 standard based on the “broadband 
communication mechanism” which is applied with a message-
oriented transmission protocol as shown in Figure 2 [7]. This 
protocol was initially created by German automotive system 
supplier Robert Bosch in the mid-1980s specifically for 
automotive applications to make them more reliable, safe, and 
fuel efficient while at the same time to decrease wiring-
harness weight and complexity. Due to these advantages, the 
CAN protocol is also a good candidate for other areas such as 
aerospace, maritime, railway vehicles, industrial automation 
and medical equipment [3].  
 
Figure 2:  CAN protocol data transmission 
 
The first successful example of CAN usage in ESA 
missions returns to the SMART-1 satellite in the late '90s [8]. 
However, mostly because of the widespread adoption of MIL-
STD-1553B, it has taken some time for the CAN bus to get 
real traction in Space community. The research and activities 
performed by Thales Alenia Space Italia (TAS-I) 
demonstrated the CAN bus as an effective solution for both 
scientific and SATCOM missions [9]. Recently developed, the 
ECSS-E-50-15C standard “CAN bus extension protocol” 
extends the CAN bus specification to cover the aspects 
required to satisfy the particular needs of spacecraft data 
handling systems [10]. The CAN IP cores have been used in 
some notable ASIC developments (GR712RC, UT699/UT700, 
AT9713E, COLE) as well as in custom FPGA developments 
targeting missions such as the Eurostar E3000 for telecoms, 
Sentinel 1 for Earth observation, and the Exomars rover for 
science and space exploration, the International Space Station 
(ISS) etc. However, the ASIC design of a fault tolerant CAN 
IP core has not been developed yet. The FPGA based HDL 
core is developed and evaluated. When these HDL IP core is 
completely developed, their new features will also be included 
in all future rad-hard ASIC developments. 
In this paper, we aim to develop an IP core for CAN 
controller based on FPGA. The proposed core has been 
hardened through the fault masking and diagnosing methods. 
Also, the fault model is related to space radiation in satellite 
environments.    
There is a considerable of literature on CAN controller 
implementation based on FPGA [11-13]. Some preliminary 
works were carried out in the early 1990s, while the 
continuing revolution in FPGA technologies demands newer 
designs. Also, the harsh space environments force the 
designers to provide the hardening techniques. 
In satellites, when a charged particle in the space 
environment strikes to an active area of an integrated circuit, it 
generates a transient current pulse that can cause unwanted 
effects. This phenomenon is able to produce an inversion in 
the stored value in the memory cells and registers. A bit flip in 
the memory cell is called single event effect (SEU), and it is 
one of the major concerns in SRAM-based FPGAs. An 
effective strike can also provoke multiple bit upsets (MBU) in 
the registers and transient effect (SET) in microelectronics. 
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is the most frequently used 
mitigation technique in which the main module is triplicated 
and through a majority voter, the valid output is selected. In 
order to use this approach on FPGA, some pitfalls should be 
considered [14] to achieve an accurate scheme. Also, to verify 
the fault masking ability of the mitigation method, the fault 
injection methods are used in the literature [15].   
This paper aims to provide an area efficient, fault tolerant 
structure for CAN controller on SRAM based FPGAs. Firstly, 
we represent our HDL based CAN controller which is fully 
tested and validated by hardware. Then we investigate 
hardening techniques and introduce dual duplex structure to 
mitigate SEU faults. We analyse the reliability of the 
hardening methods and show that with an appropriate 
coverage factor, the dual duplex provides better dependability. 
Finally, through the fault injection platform, we tested the 
hardening techniques against single and multi-upset faults. We 
have used some features like CRC check and bit stuffing 
capabilities in CAN protocol to achieve better coverage factor.     
Based on reliability analysis and fault injection results the 
proposed dual duplex method provides better dependability, 
although it requires more resources. In the following section 
we detailed the fault model and mitigation technique. 
 
II. FAULT MODEL AND MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
 
The basic internal structures of the FPGAs are very similar. 
Normally, a sort of configurable logic blocks (CLBs) has been 
integrated with programmable switch matrixes that connect 
the logic blocks according to the design requirements [14] (0). 
The user required logics are synthesized in CLB blocks, these 
blocks are routed through the switch matrixes to provide the 
user desired function. The logic mapping and routing scheme 
are completed through a sort of programming bits, which are 
called bit stream. According to the FPGA technologies, the bit 
stream is stored in SRAM memory, Flash memory, or directly 
set a sort of fuse. In case of SRAM based FPGAs, which are 
more attractive for designers, we encounter a serious challenge 
for aerospace applications.        
   
 
 
Figure 3: Virtex-4 FPGA architecture [14]  
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Figure 3: Virtex-4 FPGA architecture [14]  
All logics in slices are based on look-up tables, which are 
the same as SRAM memory. Also the interconnections in 
switch matrixes are controlled through the SRAM based 
memory cells. The basic structure of the switch matrix and 
single event upset effect is illustrated in 0, more details have 




Figure 4: Basic switch structure and SEU effect [13] 
 
In the past decade, various SEU mitigation techniques to 
detect, mask, or modify the fault effect for FPGAs have been 
proposed. According to the design, the designers have utilized 
a type of redundancy in the data layer, software layer, 
hardware layer, and over the time. In some cases, hybrid 
methods are used for this purpose. Triple modular redundancy 
(TMR) is a well-known hardware redundancy technique for 
masking SEU effect in integrated circuits. For FPGAs, this 
mitigation method can be applied in a single FPGA. However, 
it requires special consideration to overcome some pitfalls 
which are happening when TMR is used in a single FPGA. 
Due to the fact that all the logic paths and the flip flops are 
susceptible to SEU faults, full module redundancy is required 
in FPGAs. 
  To provide the triple modular redundancy, the designers 
should divide the scheme in three parts: logical parts, Flip-
Flops, and input/outputs. For the combinational logic (time-
independent logic), the scheme is triplicated and a majority 
voter like 0, is placed in the outputs. Also for the output/input 
pins, the internal 3-state buffers are used instead of Look-Up 
Tables (LUTs), which are used to implement all the Boolean 
functions in FPGA based designs as shown in 0.  
 
 




Figure 6: Output/Input Buffer Style Majority Vote Circuit [16] 
For the sequential logic in which the Flip-Flops are used, 
more consideration is required. For these sections, firstly all 
Flip-Flops are triplicated, then the outputs of each set of the 
same Flip-Flops are voted through a local voter. Finally, the 
output of the local majority voters is spread over the scheme. 
In order to apply TMR over the designer’s scheme, Xilinx 
Corporation has presented XTMR tools. But, this tool is 
allocated for space grade devices and cannot be considered as 
COTS. Therefore, we have developed a soft framework that is 
able to automatically complete its process. In the following 
section, we have detailed the design and hardening of the 
proposed CAN controller in SRAM based FPGA 
The proposed CAN bus controller in this paper is 
completely based on FPGA. Only in the physical layer, we 
have used a transceiver from NXP Semiconductor. According 
to the CAN 2.0A protocol, the proposed CAN controller 
supports 11-bit ID in the frames.   
As illustrated in Figure 7:, the CAN bus layers includes 
three main subsets. In Object layer, in which the message is 
filtered and message status is handled. In the transfer layer, the 
fault confinement, error detection, bit stuffing, bit rate, 
message framing, arbitration, and validation is completed. In 
the physical layer, the appropriate signal level and 




Figure 7: CAN Network layers 
 
In the proposed scheme, we have completely covered the 
required parameters. According to the CAN protocol, in order 
to overcome the unwanted individual oscillations on CAN 
network, a bit is inserted every time five identical bits  appears 
in line. As we know, the number of bits which are transmitted 
in a CAN network per second are represented by a parameter 
nominated as Bit Rate. Every node on CAN network must 
have the same predefined bit rate. In the proposed scheme, we 
have set the bus Bit Rate is equal to 250 kBit/s.  Moreover, 
according to the CAN standard, four segments are defined for 
a nominated bit time that include: synchronization segment, 
propagation delay segment, and phase buffer segments 1 & 2. 
To determine the bit value, a single or multiple sampling is set 
in the middle of phase segment 1 and phase segment 2. We 
take three samples and vote among them. By the way, if two 
of the three are dominant, the sample is recorded as dominant. 
The CAN network provides some Error detection 
mechanisms: bit check, frame check, CRC coding, 
Acknowledgement Check, and bit stuffing. According to these 
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mechanisms, the proposed scheme is able to detect an error in 
the data layer. Like all other controllers, after a bit is 
transmitted on the network, we read back and check the bit 
from line. If a collision is detected, this means that a node with 
higher priority is on network. Therefore, we stop data transfer 
and listen to line. Another fault detection mechanism is frame 
check, in which a collision is detected in some specific bit 
fields that always have fixed values. In this condition, we have 
provided an error frame on network. The CRC coding and 
check bits are another error detection mechanism. We always 
calculate the CRC codes for all received and transmitted data. 
A mismatch in CRC codes are treated as a faulty frame. 
Moreover, if an error condition is detected, the 
acknowledgement bit in the frame is handled to detect faults. 
As mentioned before, we have used bit stuffing mechanism in 
the proposed scheme. Therefore, if more than five identical 
bits in a data frame is detected, an error frame is transmitted. 
Finally, the fault confinement is a major and final step in the 
CAN protocol to provide a reliable data link [11]. We have 
used a generic parameter to limit the scope of fault affection 
into the local area, and protect other nodes from getting 
contaminated by a faulty node. 
The finite state machine (FSM) of the proposed scheme is 
represented in 0. Each color in this figure illustrates a portion 
of the proposed controller tasks. The idle state or initial state is 
the zero state which has a gray color. In this state, the FSM 
waits for a frame sends request from top level, or expects a 
new frame from CAN bus. The required states to receive a 
frame from bus are distinguished by green color, and the red 
states represent the associated states to send a frame on bus.  
After a frame is formed in the second state, we may encounter 
with a priority collision in the third state. In this case, the FSM 
switches to state 1, and starts to receive a high priority 
message. It is required to mention that the error detection 
mechanisms are used in all states. As soon as, an error is 
detected, an error frame is transmitted. Fault management and 
handling start from state 6, when all the standards are 
completed. After any frame is transfered on CAN network, all 
nodes must release the bus. The blue states in FSM are used 
for this purpose. Moreover, the handshaking with the top level 
is completed in the orange states. After a transmission on the 
bus is completed, the FSM returns to its initial state. 
When an error is detected, the state machine is switched to 
error frame transmission state. Also, when an overflow occurs 
on the bus, the overload frame is handled. In the proposed 
scheme, we initialize these conditions in state 6 and 15. For 
both cases, the state machine waits until the frame capture is 
completed (Rx = 0). Then, the controller transmits 6-12 zero 
bits on bus. Finally, seven recessive bits are set on the bus to 
terminate the frame transfer. 0 and 0 illustrate the required 
states to provide overload and error frames in the proposed 












Figure 10: Finite state machine for overload frame  
 
In order to mitigate the SEU faults, we have used these 
approaches in our designs: hardware duplicating over the 
standalone hardware CAN controller, duplex with comparison 
inside the FPGA, triple modular redundancy over the proposed 
HDL CAN controller in FPGA, and dual duplex with 
comparison inside the FPGA over the proposed HDL soft core 
as shown in 0 to Figure 15:.  For the subsystems that have no 
FPGA, as illustrated in 0, we have duplicated the CAN 
standalone controller and all other related devices.  For the 
FPGA based subsystems, we have investigated DwC, TMR, 
and DDwC versions of the proposed scheme. As mentioned, to 
triplicate the design, we have used three similar units with a 
voter. We have also cut out the outputs of all Flip-Flops as 
shown in 0, and fed back the output of the voter to each 
replica.     
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Figure 14: Special Triple modular redundancy in FPGA 
 
 
Figure 15: Dual duplex with comprator (DDwC) inside the FPGA 
 
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
 
The RAMS expression refers to Reliability, Availability, 
MTTF, and Security which are related to the ability of the 
system to achieve an acceptable level of reliability in 
communication satellites. A capability of the system 
component to continue their functionality under faulty 
condition is defined as reliability. Some external and internal 
factors may affect the reliability of an FPGA-based system. 
The internal factors refer to dissipation and defects that occur 
during the manufacturing process, while the external factors 
are mostly about the environmental issues like space 
radiations. All of these factors are summarized in a λ 
parameter which is defined as failure rate. In the previous 
section, we have introduced three basic structures to develop a 
fault tolerant FPGA-based CAN from the proposed plain 
version. In this section, we have analyzed the reliability of the 
aforementioned structures. First of all, it is better to mention 
that if the failure rate of a system is λ, its reliability is defined 
as R (t) = Exp (-λt) [17]. In order to calculate the reliability of 
the other structures, most literatures have provided Poisson 
Process and Markov Chain [17]. Based on these methods, for 
Duplex with comparison approach, we have:  
 
                  2. 2 1  DwC comR t R t R t CR t R t                (1) 
 
In which,  .comR t  is defined as reliability 
of comparator. C is the Coverage Factor, which is defined as 
the probability that a faulty processor will be correctly 
diagnosed, identified and disconnected. The fault converge has 
a major role in the reliability of this method. The CAN 
protocol supports some internal fault detection mechanisms 
such as: bit stuffing, CRC check and so on. These mechanisms 
provide an acceptable level of coverage factor.   
For triple modular redundancy, the reliability can be 
calculated according to (2). R voter (t) is defined as reliability 
of the voter.   
                         2 3Voter 3 2TMRR t R t R t R t              (2) 
 
For the last structure, DDwC, we have duplicated two 
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coverage factor of the new structure is remained as the same, 
the reliability of this method can be calculated as: 
 
          2 2 2. 2 1DDwC com DwC DwC DwCR t R t R t CR t R t       (3) 
 
In order to have a more sensible parameter, the average time 
to failures with the modeling assumption that the failed system 
is not repaired is defined as the mean time to failure(MTTF), 




 . If the comparator and 
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According to these results, if we have an appropriate 
coverage factor, the MTTF for the dual duplex method is more 
attractive. Also, MTTF of TMR structure is less than MTTF 
of the plain version, and this is not desirable. 
 
IV. SIMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
 
The simulation and implementation results of the proposed 
design on industrial Xilinx Virtex-4 FPGA show that the 
minimum period of 6.792ns (Maximum Frequency: 
147.224MHz) can be achieved by the plane version (0). Also, 
for the tripled version maximum frequency of 98.211MHz is 
obtained.  Moreover, the device utilization for the plane and 




Figure 16: Test hardware structure  
 
Table 1 
Device utilization summary for plain version 
 
Logic Utilization Used Available Utilization 
No. of Slices 469 5472 8% 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 240 10944 2% 
No. of 4 input LUTs 826 10944 7% 
No. of bonded IOBs 64 240 26% 
No. of BRAMs 2 32 6% 




Device utilization summary for TMR version 
 
Logic Utilization Used Available Utilization 
No. of Slices 1542 5472 28% 
No. of Slice Flip Flops 723 10944 6.6% 
No. of 4 input LUTs 2570 10944 27% 
No. of bonded IOBs 64 240 26% 
No. of BRAMs 6 32 18.7% 
No. of GCLKs 469 5472 8% 
 
After the design and hardening of the CAN controller 
scheme is complemented, we have provided appropriate 
simulation test-benches to test its function. Like previous 
works in this field, we attempted to perform all tests according 
to the CAN specifications which are detailed in [18]. In 0 and 
0, data transmission simulation with and without bit stuffing 
have been represented. However, some specifications which 
require more challenges have been tested on the hardware 
platform through two completely the same platforms. A 
similar hardware is used to validate the priority issue in the 
CAN protocol. Furthermore, in order to insure that the 
proposed scheme is completely compatible with the other 
ASIC CAN controllers, we have tested the proposed scheme 
with AT90CAN32 which is a low-power CMOS 8-bit 
microcontroller that supports an embedded CAN controller 
Figure 19:. The simulation and hardware implementation 














Figure 19: Entwicklungskit  CAN2UART to test the proposed scheme 
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CAN protocol. Furthermore, in order to insure that the 
proposed scheme is completely compatible with the other 
ASIC CAN controllers, we have tested the proposed scheme 
with AT90CAN32 which is a low-power CMOS 8-bit 
microcontroller that supports an embedded CAN controller 
Figure 19:. The simulation and hardware implementation 














Figure 19: Entwicklungskit  CAN2UART to test the proposed scheme 
 
 
V. FAULT INJECTION PLATFORM AND RESULTS 
 
After verifying the correctness of the designed and the 
implemented scheme by means of simulations and on real 
system, we have used DPR-FIP tool to inject single faults in 
fault tolerant versions to validate their capability in faulty 
conditions.  The complete DPR-FIP platform is illustrated in 
[15]. The test setup, shown in 0 and 0, consists of a personal 
computer, fault injection controller, and FPGA platform. The 
personal computer provides a complete graphic user interface 
(GUI) to monitor and control of the SEU emulation process. 
The second part is a single event error (SEE) fault controller 
based on LPC2368 microcontroller. It receives the fault 
injection modes from PC and controls the configuration bit 
stream of FPGA. All required timings and signaling are 
managed through this external microcontroller. The third part 
is the FPGA platform which hosts the design under test (DUT) 
and other modules. The configuration space of the FPGA is 
divided in two separate segments. One part is allocated to 
DUT, which is in our case, it is CAN controller, and another 
one is assigned to the fault-free version of DUT, ICAP 
interface, a comparator, and other redundant versions. 
Table 3 summarizes the resource utilizations and fault 
injection results. According to the results, the duplicated 
duplex with comparison have the best result in faulty 
condition, although it requires more resources. When the 
numbers of concurrent errors are increased, and the system is 
faced with multi bit upset faults, the mitigation capabilities of 
the dual duplex system are more outstanding. Table 4 
represents the fault injection results in multi bit upset 
condition, in which we have investigated two and three bit 




Figure 20: Block Diagram for SEU Fault injection 
 
 
Figure 21: Hardware Set Up for SEU Fault injection 
 
Table 3 
Fault injection result in four version of CAN controller 
 
Version Source SEU Fault injection results 
Flip Flop LUT tables Switch Matrix CLBs 
Plain 240 723 231 481 
DwC 488 1503 65 91 
TMR 826 2570 23 86 




Multi Fault injection results in four version of CAN controller 
 
Version 
2-bit Upset Fault injection 
results 
3-bit Upset Fault injection 
results 
Switch Matrix CLBs Switch Matrix CLBs 
Plain 920 2344 3542 5432 
DwC 1234 1982 2431 3214 
TMR 910 1024 1294 1793 
DDwC 154 192 213 482 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
An implementation of a data handling protocol for 
aerospace applications can be achieved in different ways, but 
the FPGA based approach is more appropriate for deep space 
applications. This is due to the fact that the space qualified 
standalone CAN controllers and the embedded CAN 
microcontrollers are not developed appropriately. Continuous 
development in the FPGA technologies and the newly 
developed hardening techniques for FPGAs encourage the 
designers to propose a novel fault tolerated designs. In this 
paper, a fault tolerant data handling protocol based on FPGAs 
was presented. Through the simulation and hardware platform 
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